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While previous literature has offered two broad categories of explanation for individual trade 
preferences: economic self-interest and non-economic factors, we contend that during times of 
intensified elite discourse on trade, individuals may follow elite opinions to form their opinions 
on trade. Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Survey, we examine the effect 
of Trump’s protectionist views and rhetoric on public trade opinion. We argue that there was a 
“Trump effect” on trade attitudes among the mass public in 2016 and this effect went beyond the 
party line, meaning  that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely to 
be influenced by his protectionist views and to adopt anti-free trade positions. Moreover, we 
suggest a conditional effect of political knowledge on the “Trump effect” of trade opinion. Our 
empirical tests offer strong support for both hypotheses, suggesting a significant “Trump effect” 
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 The costs and benefits of free trade has been long debated among social scientists. Despite 
the consensus among economists that free trade is mutually beneficial to involved countries 
through greater production and more efficient resource allocation, open trade also has inevitable 
negative political consequences. The rapid growth of open trade in the second half of the 20th 
century, in part, led to losses of manufacturing jobs and deep discontent among citizens in 
western developed countries (Margalit 2012; Rodrik 1997).  Puzzled by the discrepancy between 
the widely known benefits of free trade and waves of protectionist sentiment among the public, 
scholars have endeavored to explore the determinants of public opinion on trade, proposing 
explanations such as economic self-interests, education, nationalism and ethnocentrism, concerns 
about the social and cultural consequences, partisanship, issue framing, endorsement, and 
wording of survey questions  (Heckscher 1919; Stolper and Samuelson 1941; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Herrmann et al. 2001; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Hiscox 
2006; Medrano and Braun 2012; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Balistreri 1997; Mansfield and Mutz 
2009; Margalit 2012; Mutz and Kim 2017; Winslett 2016; Dür and Schlipphak 2020).  
 Building upon previous literature, we contend that during times of intensified elite 
rhetoric on trade and trade policies, individuals may follow elite discourse to form their trade 
opinions. In this paper, we examine the effect of political elites on public trade opinion in the 
context of the 2016 presidential election. In 2016, Trump’s negative rhetoric toward trade during 
the presidential race was a national sensation. A significant part of Trump’s campaign was based 
on criticism of current US trade policy and its large trade deficit. We chose the 2016 election 
year because this election features the first major presidential candidate in recent US history who 
fiercely attacked free trade; it provides an excellent example of heightened volume of one-sided 
elite discourse on the issue of trade. We argue that presidential candidate Donald Trump had a 
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strong influence on trade attitudes among the mass public, and this effect could go beyond 
partisanship. Building on the rich literature of political elites’ influence on public preferences, 
we hypothesize that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely 
influenced by his protectionist views because of their pre-existing anti-openness predispositions. 
In addition, the “Trump effect” should be larger among more knowledgeable Trump supporters 
because they are more likely to acquire political messages on trade and more able to analyze and 
accept Trump’s messages consistent with their anti-openness predispositions.  
 Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES), we find strong 
support for our hypotheses. Indeed, supporters of Donald Trump are significantly more likely to 
oppose free trade and support limiting imports from other countries even after controlling for a 
full range of explanations suggested by previous literature and accounting for the possibility of 
reciprocal causality. Furthermore, we find evidence of the conditional effect of political 
knowledge on this “Trump effect:” politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely 
to be influenced by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. Interestingly, once we consider “Trump 
support” as an explanation, we see the effect of partisanship disappears; in a robustness check 
with split samples we find that the “Trump effect” is more salient among Democrats and 
Independents. 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that theories on public opinion formation based 
solely on economic interests or party-driven changes cannot capture the whole story of trade 
opinion, and that the persuasive power of political elites does not necessarily only operate 
through a partisan channel. Our findings contribute to the trade opinion literature by 
demonstrating that trade attitudes can be influenced by political elites, a viewpoint that prior 
research on trade opinion has not focused much attention on. In addition, the findings reveal the 
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possibility that elite persuasion could sometimes play an even more important role in public 
opinion formation than economic reasoning or even partisanship.  
 In the remainder of the paper, we first offer a detailed theoretical account on the 
determinants of trade opinion proposed by previous literature. We then discuss how and why 
elite rhetoric may influence citizens’ attitudes and extend this to the possible influence of Donald 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric on Americans’ trade opinion, and further, discuss how this 
relationship may be conditional upon political knowledge. In the next section, we introduce our 
data and empirical methods used to test our hypotheses. In the last two sections, we discuss the 
statistical results, our findings and their implications for future research.  
Determinants of Trade Opinion 
 The most well-known existing research on trade opinion attributes a great deal of the 
variance in trade attitudes to individuals’ economic self-interest (Stolper and Samuelson 1941; 
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Balistreri 1997). For example, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory suggests that in skill-abundant countries, free trade will increase the 
demand for and raise the relative wages of high-skill workers but decrease the demand for and 
lower the relative prices of low-skill workers. As a result, high-skill workers will likely support 
free trade but their low-skill counterparts will oppose it (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). 
Numerous studies have found empirical support for the Heckscher-Olin theory on trade opinion 
in the US, Canada, Latin America and in a cross-national context (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; 
Balistreri 1997; Baker 2003; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001).  
 The later Ricardo-Viner model argues that workers cannot easily move across sectors in the 
short run, and therefore one’s trade opinion is based on how open trade influences the sector that 
one works in. As a result, individuals working in import-intensive sectors will oppose free trade, 
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but individuals working in export-intensive sectors will support free trade (Brock & Magee 
1978; Irwin 1998). The Ricardo-Viner model, also called the specific factors theory, has gained 
relatively less empirical support. Researchers find that whether or not an individual works in 
import- or export-intensive sector is at best a weak predictor of one’s trade preferences (Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001; Hays, Erlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).  
 More recently, a growing body of literature argues that trade opinion can be also influenced 
by non-economic factors such as individuals’ feelings about out-groups based on ethnocentrism 
and nationalism, partisanship, as well as concerns over the social and cultural consequences of 
trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 
2001; Mutz 2017). For instance, by employing data from the National Annenberg Election 
Survey and a survey conducted by Knowledge Networks, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that 
economic self-interest, whether it be skill-based or sector-based, has little influence on 
Americans’ trade attitudes. Instead, one’s educational attainment is a strong predictor of trade 
opinion, and education is a reflection of one’s anxiety from out-group threats based on 
tendencies toward nationalism, isolationism and ethnocentrism. Those with higher levels of 
tolerance for out-groups and with more cosmopolitan worldviews will likely support free trade, 
but those holding ethnocentric, nationalist and isolationist views will likely oppose free trade 
(Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Likewise, Kaltenthaler et al. (2004) also find education as the most 
important predictor of individual attitudes toward trade liberalization.   
Building upon this stream of research, Margalit (2012) contends that opposition to free trade 
can be also caused by individuals’ concerns over the social and cultural consequences of open 
trade, such as increased foreign influence, westernization, and the loss of traditional moral codes. 
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In her recent book, Guisinger (2017) argues that concerns over trade’s impact on communities 
and the nation as a whole plays an important role in public trade opinion than one’s self-interest. 
 Another group of researchers focused their attention on political predictors of trade attitudes 
(Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mutz 2017; Hiscox 2006; Medrano and Braun 2012; Winslett 2016; 
Dür  and Schlipphak 2020). Among them, some argue for the importance of partisanship in 
shaping one’s trade opinion (Mutz 2017), while others investigate the effects of framing and 
endorsement (Hiscox 2006; Medrano and Braun 2012) or the relationship between trade opinion 
and party competition (Winslett 2016). For example, Mutz (2017) ascribed Americans’ trade 
opinion changes after 2016 to party realignment. According to her, even though the Republican 
party was known as the party of free trade in America for decades, conservatives and 
Republicans began to show more negative views about free trade compared to their liberal and 
Democratic counterparts in recent years. The primary reason was because conservatives and 
Republicans have long held higher levels of nationalist views, racial antipathy and social 
dominance orientation, all of which could contribute to opposition to open trade (Mutz 2017). 
Medrano and Braun (2012) argue that the majority of citizens are uninformed and their answers 
to survey questions on free trade depends on how survey questions are framed, their perceived 
degree of economic vulnerability and endorsements by political parties and interest groups.  
Framing and endorsement are two other political predictors that are found to influence 
public trade opinion. In an experiment, Hiscox (2006) discovers that participants are 17% less 
likely to favor freer trade when exposed to anti-trade framing such as discussions linking trade to 
job losses; however, pro-trade framing linking trade with lower consumer prices does not have 
an effect on individuals’ trade opinion. Additionally, Hiscox (2006) finds that less educated 
respondents are more sensitive to the framing effect, and endorsement can raise support for trade 
8 
 
across the board especially among those who received anti-trade framing. Using a survey 
experiment, Dür and Schlipphak (2020) only find limited evidence for elite cueing effects on 
citizens’ support for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in both Germany 
and Spain, but they argue that the elite cueing effects are likely understated because of 
participants’ possible exposure to elite cues outside the context of the experiment. Other research 
on trade opinion suggests that the general public is less likely than elites to support free trade 
(Hermann et. al, 2001), and that parties do change their approach to trade policy depending on 
the distribution of public opinion in the electorate (Winslett 2016). 
Another type of framing that could affect Americans’ trade opinion is the connection of 
trade issues with China. In an experimental study, Kerner, Sumner and Richter (2020) show 
participants a pet furniture advertisement mentioning offshore production and then ask their 
support for free trade. They find that only the “offshore production in China” prime reduces 
support for free trade. It is not surprising that Americans connect China with their attitudes 
toward free trade, as it is widely perceived that trade with China has caused higher 
unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets in the 
US (Autor et al. 2013; 2016). 
 Beyond the Party Line: The Influence of Elite Rhetoric on Trade Opinion 
 Even though the trade opinion literature has not focused a lot of attention on the effect of 
political elites, public opinion scholars have had a long tradition exploring the influence of 
political elites on citizens’ policy preferences in general (Zaller 1992; Jacoby 1988; Cohen 2003; 
Johnston 2006; Broockman & Butler 2017, Gabel & Scheve 2007).  In his classic work, Zaller 
(1992) argues that mass public opinion is influenced heavily by political elites such as 
politicians, upper-level government officials, journalists, political activists, and policy 
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specialists. Zaller uses the “Receive-Accept-Sample” model to explain how political elites can 
play an important role in individuals’ formulation of political opinions. Besides Zaller’s research 
which is perhaps the most well-known work in the field, other scholars have argued for the 
importance of political elites in changing citizens’ opinion on policy issues. For instance, 
Abramowitz (1978) finds that voters update their issue attitudes after learning about candidates’ 
positions in a presidential debate. In a field experiment, Minozzi et. al (2015) find that political 
leaders can persuade their constituents’ attitudes toward policy issues after interacting with them 
in online townhalls. Broockman and Butler (2017) also find that elites’ positions influence 
voters’ opinion in a field experiment where they send letters to citizens stating their legislators’ 
policy positions. Gabel and Scheve (2007) find that negative elite messages about European 
integration decreased public support for European Union. 
The normative implications of empirical evidence of elite-driven attitudes have drawn 
some scholarly attention too. For example, Hochschild (2012) raises questions about the meaning 
of democracy in a world in which mass opinion is driven largely by elite cutes, particularly in 
light of Zaller’s suggestion that elite opinion is better informed and hence has advantages over 
mass opinion. Hochschild identifies instances in which mass opinion correctly follows elite 
opinion (e.g., civil rights laws, tobacco smoking), as well as others in which mass opinion 
correctly deviates elite opinion (e.g., mass resistance to Clinton impeachment, the Tea Party 
movement). Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) explore the effects of polarization on 
mass susceptibility to elite cues and find that under conditions of high polarization, individuals 
are much more likely to follow and incorporate into their policy attitudes elite policy cues. 
In this paper, we build upon existing research on elite discourse and public opinion and 
argue that citizens’ trade opinion can be influenced by political elites. While the consideration of 
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elite influence on public opinion in general is not brand new, our specific focus on the nexus 
between political elites and public trade opinion contributes to the trade opinion literature. Even 
though Hiscox (2006) and others have initiated exploration in this area by studying the effects of 
framing and endorsement on trade opinion, aside from their work, political elites’ influence on 
public trade opinion remains relatively understudied. The effect of political elites on trade 
opinion is particularly relevant today considering that in recent years, numerous nationalist 
politicians in Latin America, Europe and the United States have focused on attacking free trade 
and seeking protectionist policies in their political campaigns, with Trump as a prime example.  
How Trump’s Protectionist Discourse Influences Trade Opinion 
 In 2016, Trump based a significant part of his campaign on criticism of current US trade 
policy and its large trade deficit. Trump often cited examples of job losses and factory shutdowns 
in the Rust Belt in the Midwest and Northeast to make his case (see a few examples of his 
rhetoric in the endnote)1. In addition to criticizing domestic trade policies, Donald Trump also 
blamed the US’s trade partners—especially China. Trump persistently asserted that certain trade 
partners were the culprit of the decline of certain industries in the US, especially manufacturing, 
and that US was being taken advantage of by its trade partners. For example, calling the U.S-
China trade balance a “theft,” he said, “we can't continue to allow China to rape our country” 
(Diamond 2016) (see a few more examples of similar rhetoric in the endnote)2. Trump made 
particularly effective use of various media strategies to gain exposure and disseminate his 
messages (Azari 2016). Along with traditional rallies, his protectionist rhetoric was widely 
disseminated through social media such as Twitter (Wells et al. 2016).  
 Zaller’s “Receive-Accept-Sample” model suggests that individual citizens acquire 
information from elites or trusted sources, filter it and accept information that comports with 
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their own preconceived values; when answering survey questions they will then sample 
information available at the top of their heads (Zaller 1992). Empirical evidence suggests that 
when contested issues are given significant media coverage, individuals take notice and update 
their own policy ideas consistent with their predispositions (Dancey & Goren, 2010).  According 
to Zaller (1992), political predispositions are shaped by a person’s lifetime experiences, such as 
childhood socialization and policy-related everyday experiences like paying taxes, working, or 
racial discrimination. Predispositions influence people’s responses to elite information by 
regulating the acceptance or nonacceptance of the political messages received. 
 In 2016, Trump supporters came from different backgrounds but the core Trump 
supporters shared a commonality—they all had pre-existing anti-openness predisposition. Recent 
research points out that the core Trump supporters in 2016 were either those who are “left 
behind” (McQuarrie 2017; Hackworth 2019; Clark 2017) or those who felt “status threat” from 
increased diversity and globalization (Mutz 2018; Major et al. 2016; Knowles and Tropp 2018; 
Blum and Parker 2019). Both of these two types of Trump supporters already had anti-openness 
predispositions before Trump even ran for the presidency. For instance, the first type of Trump 
supporters, those who are left behind economically such as workers in the Rust Belt of the 
Midwest and Northeast, likely already blamed international trade, openness and outsourcing for 
their job losses prior to 2016. When hearing Trump talk about unfair trade deals, trade deficits, 
and the connections with job losses, they will easily connect their own situation with these 
messages. Similarly, the other group of Trump supporters, i.e., individuals who felt their 
majority racial status or America’s global dominance status being threatened, may already have 
blamed openness for bringing in immigrants and blamed globalization for America’s economic 
decline. When they hear Trump speak about America losing to other countries, they may quickly 
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connect free trade with American’s economic decline in the world and consequently form anti-
trade opinions. 
 Given that individuals are most likely to take notice of information consistent with their 
predispositions and use that information to update their own policy ideas, we can safely argue 
that these two core groups of Trump supporters will be most likely influenced by his 
protectionist rhetoric in their trade opinion formation process due to their pre-existing anti-
openness dispositions. 3  
 Even though there is a rich body of literature that focuses on the influence of party 
identification on public opinion formation 4, we argue that there are nuances between the effects 
of political elites and partisanship. Lenz (2012) suggests that individuals often bring their issue 
attitudes in line with views of their preferred candidate instead of those of their parties. Based on 
Lenz’s foundational work, we contend that the persuasive power of political elites does not 
solely operate through a partisan channel; instead, the political elite can persuade supporters by 
tapping into their political predispositions similar to his or hers. Such persuasive power can 
reinforce one’s prior partisanship, but it can also make one challenge his or her prior partisan 
views. For example, a voter who identified as a Democrat in previous elections finds Trump an 
attractive candidate because of his stance on immigration policy might also end up adopting his 
position on trade, even though the voter is cross-pressured by his or her prior party identification. 
Despite this attitude change, the voter may not necessarily change their party affiliation 
immediately, given that it is typically stable over time. It is documented that many Democratic 
voters in the Rust Belt states, for example, chose to support Donald Trump in 2016 without 
changing their partisanship; many of them continued to vote Democratic in the 2018 midterm 
election (Cohn & Miller 2018; Dias et al. 2016).  
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 Therefore, a simple partisan explanation of mass policy attitudes cannot account for this 
pattern of change, especially in an era with prominent political figures that do not clearly fit 
traditional party lines. Given this, it is meaningful to analyze whether individuals’ opinions are 
influenced more by partisanship or by the political elite they choose to follow. Even though 
Mutz’s (2017) recent work on trade opinion ascribed the change of Americans’ trade opinion to 
party realignment, we argue that the effect of political elites might be another important reason 
for the change and the Trump effect could go beyond partisanship. 
 Based on these arguments, we propose that core Trump supporters, regardless of their 
partisanship, tend to have pre-existing anti-trade and anti-openness predispositions; when 
exposed to Trump’s protectionist rhetoric, such pre-existing political predisposition among 
Trump supporters can be “waken up” and reinforced. Therefore, compared to non-Trump 
supporters, Trump supporters are more likely influenced by Trump’s anti-trade views in forming 
their trade opinion. This “Trump effect” could go beyond the traditional Democratic-Republican 
partisan divide. From this, we develop our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, are more likely to accept 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and form anti-free trade opinions. 
Political Knowledge as a Mediator 
 A major part of Zaller’s intellectual contribution in public opinion lies in the mediating 
role of political knowledge in accepting political information to form issue attitudes. According 
to Zaller, individuals with higher levels of political knowledge are more likely to acquire and 
comprehend (“Receive”) political messages concerning a certain political issue, especially 
complex issues that are less relevant to their own everyday experience. Additionally, when 
receiving political messages from elites, individuals with higher levels of political knowledge are 
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more able to analyze received information, resist arguments contrary to their political 
predispositions and accept information consistent with their predispositions. Political knowledge 
therefore plays a dual role in the opinion formation process: on the one hand, it increases the 
likelihood for one to acquire political information; on the other, it enhances one’s ability to 
analyze and accept political messages consistent with their own political predispositions.  Those 
who possess higher levels of political knowledge are better at both tasks, resulting in a higher 
chance for them to be influenced by information consistent with their predispositions. Because 
Trump’s supporters are already more likely to hold predispositions against openness, among 
them, those with higher levels of political knowledge will be more likely to acquire information 
on trade-related issues and more likely to analyze and accept Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric. 
 More intuitively, if we compare two Trump supporters: Trump supporter A with high 
levels of political knowledge and Trump supporter B with low levels of political knowledge. 
Even though both supporters likely have anti-trade predispositions, supporter A is more likely to 
pay attention to Trump’s speech on trade and more likely to search for Trump’s trade policy 
claims. Even more crucially, supporter A’s political knowledge will help him/her analyze the 
messages and absorb the information consistent with his/her own pre-existing anti-openness 
predisposition. When asked a trade-related survey question, supporter A will more likely sample 
the accepted information to answer the question. In contrast, supporter B with low levels of 
political knowledge will be less attentive to political speeches, resulting in less exposure to 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. Even when B catches the messages, he/she is less able to analyze 
and absorb the information to update their own trade opinion.  
 One may argue that political knowledge can help individuals critically analyze the 
messages and as a result increase the chance of rejecting Trump’s messages. Indeed, according to 
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Zaller, those with higher levels of political knowledge are more able to critically analyze the 
messages they receive, but they will reject the messages inconsistent with their own 
predispositions instead of messages inconsistent with scientific findings for example. For 
individuals whose predisposition on trade differs from Trump’s views, it is true that high levels 
of political knowledge will enhance the chance for them to critically analyze and then reject 
Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric. In other words, high-knowledge Trump opposers are least likely to 
be influenced by Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric when shaping their opinion. Based on these 
arguments, we posit our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: More knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely to be influenced by 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. In contrast, more knowledgeable Trump opposers are least likely 
to be influenced by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. 
 
Data and Methods 
  In order to test our hypotheses, we employ data from the 2016 ANES, and we use two 
measures of trade opinion: (1) attitudes toward import restrictions and (2) attitudes toward free 
trade agreements. We use logistic regression and ordinal logistic regression to predict individual 
trade opinion as a function of Trump support, political knowledge, the interaction of Trump 
support and political knowledge, as well as a full set of control variables. Detailed descriptive 
statistics of all variables are included in the Supplemental Material.5 
Dependent Variables 
 Attitudes toward import restrictions.   Our first dependent variable is based on the 
following question: “Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order 
to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt 
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American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports?” 62.23% of 
respondents favored placing new limits on imports, which is coded as 0.   37.77% respondents 
opposed placing new limits on imports, which is coded as 1. 
 Attitudes toward free trade agreements.   The second dependent variable is based on the 
question: “How strongly do you favor, or oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with 
other countries?” We combine the seven-point scale response into three categories: favor (coded 
as 2, 39.51%), neither favor nor oppose (coded as 1, 40.29%), and oppose (coded as 0, 20.2%).6  
Independent Variables  
 Support for Donald Trump.    Support for Donald Trump is measured by one’s feeling 
thermometer (0-100) of Donald Trump, with 0 indicating the respondent does not like Trump 
and 100 meaning (s)he likes him.  
 Political knowledge.    We create an additive score based on nine political knowledge 
questions. These questions include: whether or not the respondent knows Senate term is 6 years, 
foreign aid is the smallest federal spending item, Republicans control the House and Senate, and 
whether the respondent can identify Joe Biden, Paul Ryan, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and 
John Roberts. These nine items have an alpha statistic of 0.72.  
 Support for Trump ×political knowledge.  In order to capture the conditional effect of 
political knowledge, we include a multiplicative term of the two variables. 
Control Variables 
 Skill level.    The Heckscher-Ohlin theory argues that in skill-abundant countries like the 
US, high-skill workers will likely support free trade but their low-skill counterparts will oppose 
it (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).  We include a measurement for individual skill level and utilize 
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the proxy of average income by industry and match that with each respondent to indirectly 
capture skill level following previous research (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).7  
 Import orientation.   The Ricardo-Viner model argues that individuals working in import-
intensive sectors will oppose free trade, but individuals working in export-intensive sectors will 
support free trade (Brock & Magee 1978; Irwin 1998). We consider the export orientation and 







).8  These two measurements are highly colinear so we only include import 
orientation in our models. 
 Partisanship. Considering the important role of partisanship on public opinion, we include 
one’s party identification as a control variable. Partisanship is a 7-point scale indicator, with 7 
indicating strong Republican and 0 indicating strong Democrat.  
 Financial worry.    In addition to the objective measures of economic self-interest, we also 
capture the subjective assessment of one’s financial situation as an explanation for trade opinion. 
We posit that individuals who worry about their financial situation are likely more vulnerable in 
the open trade environment and therefore may more likely oppose open trade. To measure 
individuals’ perception of their own financial status, we use the following question, “how 
worried are you about your current financial situation.”  
 Nationalism and Ethnocentrism. A growing body of literature argues that trade opinion 
can be also influenced by non-economic factors such as ethnocentrism and nationalism 
(Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mutz and Kim 
2017). To capture nationalism, we consider five questions related to nationalist sentiment, and 
combine them by using principal component factor analysis and regression scoring.9  Feelings 
toward out-groups, or ethnocentrism, is measured by feeling thermometers of three minority 
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groups: Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (each ranging from 0-100). We use principal component 
factor analysis in the same way to generate a factor score of ethnocentrism.10  
 Demographic controls.   We also include demographic control variables such as age, 
household income, education, union membership, and gender.  
Results 
 For each of our dependent variables, we run three models: Model (1) is a baseline model 
where we include all explanations for trade opinion but exclude support for Trump; in Model (2) 
we add our core independent variable, support for Trump, in order to test our first hypothesis, the 
“Trump Effect;”Model (3) tests the second hypothesis by adding the interaction term between 
support for Trump and political knowledge. Table 1 includes all three models with attitudes 
toward import restrictions as the dependent variable, while Table 2 includes all three models 
with attitudes toward free trade agreements as the dependent variable.  
Attitudes toward Import Restrictions 
 We first explore determinants of attitudes toward import restrictions. We purposefully coded 
opposing import limits as 1 and supporting import limits as 0, so that a positive coefficient in 
Table 1 indicates a positive association between the independent variable and support for free 
trade. As one can see from Table 1 Model (1), before we consider support for Trump, 
partisanship has a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable. Because Republican 
is coded as a higher value in partisanship, a negative coefficient of partisanship means 
Republicans are more likely to support import limits, and Democrats are more likely to oppose 
import limits. This is consistent with Mutz’s (2018) finding that Republicans were more negative 
about trade in recent years. Additionally, one’s political knowledge and education levels both 
have a positive and significant effect, but nationalism has a negative and significant effect on the 
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dependent variable. These results suggest that individuals with lower levels of education, lower 
levels of political knowledge, or stronger nationalist views are more negative about open trade.  
 Moving to Table 1 Model (2) in which we add support for Trump, we notice that Trump 
support has a negative and highly significant effect on the dependent variable.  Intuitively, this 
result suggests that Trump supporters are more likely to support placing new limits on imports, 
and this finding verifies our first hypothesis. Interestingly, once we consider Trump support, the 
effect of partisanship becomes insignificant. In other words, even though on surface it seems like 
Republicans were more likely to hold anti-trade opinions during the 2016 Presidential election, 
once we take the “Trump effect” into consideration, the role of partisanship disappears; instead, 
it is Trump supporters who consistently held more anti-trade opinion. This finding verifies our 
speculation that the “Trump effect” on trade opinion goes beyond partisan lines. In a robustness 
test, we further split our sample by respondents’ partisanship and see whether the Trump effect 
exists among Democrats and Independents.   
 In order to test our second hypothesis, we include an interaction term between political 
knowledge and support for Trump in Table 1 Model (3). The results show that both the 
interaction term and political knowledge have significant effects on the dependent variable. The 
interaction term makes straightforward interpretation of the coefficients challenging from the 
table alone, therefore, we graph a figure by using the Clarify addition to Stata 12.0 to intuitively 
display the conditional effect of political knowledge on support for Trump and 
supporting/opposing import restrictions (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000).11  Below Figure 1 
(a) displays the predicted effects of Trump support on “opposing import restrictions” among 
individuals with high and low levels of political knowledge. As one can see, the line for high 
levels of political knowledge has a much steeper slope compared to the line for low levels of 
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political knowledge, indicating that the effect of Trump support on “opposing import 
restrictions” is larger among individuals with high levels of political knowledge. More 
specifically, among political knowledgeable citizens, the predicted probability for non-Trump 
supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=0) to oppose import restrictions was about 
62%, but for Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=100) the rate quickly 
reduced down to 15%, creating a difference of 47%. However, among individuals with low 
levels of political knowledge, the difference in predicted probability of opposing import 
restrictions between non-Trump supporters (46%) and supporters (18%) is only 28 percentage 
points, a much smaller gap.   
 Figure 1(b) shows a similar pattern. Likewise, among politically knowledgeable citizens, the 
predicted probability for non-Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=0) to 
support import restrictions is only 38%, but for Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of 
Trump=100) it is 85%, for a difference of 47 percentage points. However, among individuals 
with low levels of political knowledge, the difference between non-Trump supporters (54%) and 
supporters (82%) is only 28 percentage points, a much smaller difference.  Overall, Figure 1(a) 
and (b) both show strong support for our second hypothesis, in that the “Trump effect” is 
amplified among politically knowledgeable individuals. Model (3) still shows that partisanship 
does not have a significant effect on trade opinion, while nationalism, education and financial 
worry all still have similar effects on the dependent variable. Overall, these findings lend support 
for our two hypotheses and are consistent with previous studies. In the Supplemental Material, 
we compare the magnitude of the Trump effect with the effects of other variables, and the results 
show that the Trump effect is the largest compared to other variables. 
Attitudes toward Free Trade Agreements 
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 We now turn to Table 2 when we use attitudes toward free trade agreements as our 
dependent variable. Model (1) shows that partisanship, nationalism and union membership all 
have significant and negative effects, and education has a significant and positive effect on 
attitudes toward free trade agreements. These results suggest that Republicans, Union members, 
and those with nationalist views or lower education levels are more likely to oppose free trade 
agreements. Again, we find no support for the effects of skill levels or industry-level exposure to 
trade, consistent with findings from Table 1 and those from Mansfield and Mutz (2009). 
Different from Table 1, we do not observe a significant effect of political knowledge or financial 
worry on attitudes toward free trade agreements.  
 Moving to Model (2) when we add Trump support, we find that Trump support again has a 
significant and negative effect on support for free trade, lending further support to our first 
hypothesis. Once including Trump support, we notice that the coefficients of both nationalism 
and party identification shrink and are no longer statistically significant, but education level and 
union membership still significantly impact attitudes toward free trade agreements. This suggests 
that in 2016, the “Trump effect” on trade opinion goes beyond partisan lines, and it is Trump’s 
supporters that were more likely to hold negative views about free trade agreements, rather than 
a particular partisan or ideological group.  
 To test our second hypothesis, Model (3) includes an interaction term between Trump 
support and political knowledge. Again, in order to more intuitively interpret the conditional 
effect, we graph figures by using the Clarify addition to Stata 12.0 (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 
2000) and present the results in Figure 2.  Figure 2(a) and 2(b) display the predicted probabilities 
for supporting and opposing free trade agreements, respectively, across support for Trump 
among individuals with high and low levels of political knowledge. In both figures, the lines 
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representing high levels of political knowledge show a steeper curve, suggesting a larger effect 
of Trump support on attitudes toward free trade agreements. In Figure 2(a), we can see that as 
Trump support increases from 0 to 100, the predicted probability of favoring free trade 
agreements decreased quickly from 59% to 19% among those who are politically 
knowledgeable. Yet, among individuals with low levels of political knowledge, the predicted 
probability of favoring free trade agreements stayed relatively the same, only changing from 
47% to 30%. This is because individuals with low levels of political knowledge are less likely to 
acquire or receive political information on trade issues, and even if they do, they are less able to 
analyze the message to accept/reject it based on their political predisposition.  
 Figure 2(b) shows a similar pattern. The predicted probability of opposing free trade 
agreements is the highest among Trump supporters with high levels of political knowledge. This 
is because (1) Trump supporters are more likely to hold anti-trade political predispositions, and 
(2) politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely to acquire information on trade 
issues and also more able to accept protectionist rhetoric in forming their opinions as such 
rhetoric is consistent with their own predisposition. Overall, Figure 2 provides decent support for 
our second hypothesis. In the Supplemental Material, we compare the magnitude of the Trump 
effect with the effects of education (the only control variable that has a significant effect) , and 
the results show that the magnitude of the Trump effect is comparable to that of education. 
 In sum, our empirical findings offer strong support for both of our hypotheses: supporters 
of Donald Trump are more likely to adopt a protectionist view of trade, and this effect varies 
based on individuals’ ability to accept these messages based on their political knowledge. 
Additionally, we show that although there appears to be a partisan difference in trade opinions, 
the effect of partisanship disappears when we consider support for Trump. Objective measures of 
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one’s economic self-interest such as their skill level and the import-orientation of their sector do 
not have a significant effect on trade opinion.  Our findings also suggest that education is a 
consistently important factor for individual opinions on trade, even after taking account of 
emotional factors based on nationalism and ethnocentrism, consistent with prior research which 
finds consistent effects of education (e.g. Kaltenthaler etl al, 2004). Nationalist views have a 
significant effect on Americans’ trade opinion, although the effect of nationalism on attitudes 
toward free trade agreements falls out when considering Trump support.  These findings are 
consistent with conclusions drawn by an important trade opinion study in Mansfield and Mutz 
(2009). Even though we did not find any evidence that ethnocentrism affects trade opinion, it is 
perhaps because trade opinion is centered around concerns of the declining status of the nation 
rather than a specific racial group.  
Robustness Checks 
Using IV-2SLS to Address Endogeneity 
 Even though our empirical analyses show strong support for both hypotheses, we find it 
imperative to address the problem of reverse causality, or endogeneity between support for 
Trump and trade opinion. Fordham and Kleinberg (2012), for example, claim that predicting 
support for trade based on related attitudes is inherently problematic in terms of determining the 
direction of causality. In our case, it is possible that individuals’ trade attitudes are influenced by 
Trump’s rhetoric; however, it is also possible that individuals choose to support Trump because 
of their existing anti-trade attitudes. In order to better test our hypothesis, we need to ensure the 
Trump effect on trade opinion is robust even when accounting for the possibility of reverse 
causality. To do this, we employ a two-stage least-squares model with instrumental variables 
(IV-2SLS) to address the endogeneity issue. By using instruments which are exogenous to the 
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dependent variable and highly correlated with our independent variable, we can “purge” the 
endogenous component of the independent variable and assess whether its effect on our 
dependent variable still holds (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007).  
 We are able to identify three instrumental variables from the 2016 ANES dataset which 
meet the required conditions: (1) respondents’ opinion on whether the country needs a “strong, 
determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path;” (2) respondents’ 
opinion on whether Barack Obama is a Muslim; and (3) a feeling thermometer towards illegal 
immigrants. These instruments meet the requirements because: (1) they are related to support for 
Trump; (2) there is no direct theoretical causal connection between these three instruments and 
individuals’ trade opinion. A more detailed description on how we choose these instruments and 
a full set of diagnosis tests are included in the Supplemental Materials. All the diagnosis tests 
show that our instruments meet all the requirements.  
 Turning to the results of the IV-2SLS models, in the first stage models, as shown in Table 
3, we estimate Trump support as a function of the instrumental variables and the control 
variables in our original models. The predicted values of the first stage models, or fitted values, 
represent an instrumented measure of Trump support purged of the influence of trade attitudes. 
We then, in the second stage models, use the purged Trump support variable to predict two 
dependent variables: (1) attitudes toward import restrictions, (2) attitudes toward free trade 
agreements.  
 Results of the second stage models are presented in Table 4. In Table 4 Model (1), the 
coefficient for Trump Support (b= -.008, SE= .001) is still negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that Trump support still has a significant positive effect on trade opinion even after 
we control for endogeneity. Likewise, the coefficient for Trump support in Model (2) (b= -.009, 
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SE= .002) is still negative and statistically significant, also suggesting that Trump support still 
has the same effect on support for free trade agreement after accounting for endogeneity. Based 
on these results, we are confident that our empirical tests withstand the challenges of 
endogeneity and reverse causality.  
Differentiating Trump Effect from Partisan Effect 
 In this paper, we argue that elite persuasion can have effects above and beyond that of 
partisanship, but we also understand that the effect of political elites and partisan effect can be 
hard to differentiate. For example, one may raise the concern that changes in trade attitudes 
among the highly politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are actually because of 
Republicans bringing their attitudes in line with the Republican presidential nominee. We 
conduct some additional analyses to further differentiate the Trump effect from partisan effect. 
We argue that if the above-mentioned concern is true, then the “Trump effect” on trade attitudes 
should be observed only among Republican copartisans, and not among Democrats or 
independents, as non-Republicans do not have the same party pressure to update their beliefs. 
We would also observe that only the individuals most supportive of Trump exhibit this pattern of 
updating their beliefs, as opposed to individuals who are cold or lukewarm towards Trump. To 
test whether the effects of Trump support on trade opinion follow these patterns, we re-estimate 
Model (3) from Tables 1 and 2, this time splitting our sample by party identification 
(Independent, Democrats, and Republicans) and Trump support (0-50 vs 51-100).  
The results show a different pattern as predicted by a partisan explanation. It appears that 
the impact of Trump support on trade attitudes is more salient among Democrats and 
independents, and the group of individuals who are cold or lukewarm toward Trump. In fact, we 
observe null effects for Trump support when we restrict the sample to Republicans only or to 
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strong Trump supporters only. We have included these additional results in our Supplemental 
Materials. Taken together, these results suggest an opposite pattern of what we would expect if 
trade attitude changes were driven primarily by partisan motivated reasoning (i.e., Republicans 
being influenced by their party’s nominee); therefore, we are confident that the Trump effect we 
observe is truly driven by Trump himself and it is beyond the partisan effect. 
Is the Trump Effect Repeatable? 
 In order to make sure the “Trump effect” we observe in 2016 is not a single case, we provide 
additional evidence to show that the effect of elite rhetoric is enduring and repeatable. 
Considering that an important reason behind the observed Trump effect is Trump’s fierce attack 
against free trade, we needed to find another presidential candidate who did the same, and this 
itself was a difficult task, simply because Trump was the first major party presidential candidate 
to openly advocate U.S. foreign trade retrenchments.  In recent history, we only found one third 
party presidential candidate, who similarly attacked free trade. In the 1992 presidential election, 
Ross Perot, the Reform Party presidential candidate famously said that a trade agreement like 
NAFTA will cause a “giant sucking sound” when jobs are lost to Mexico (Shalken 2019). He 
fiercely and openly attacked free trade and repeatedly said free trade was bad for American jobs. 
His message resonated with “workers, unions, environmentalists and people in manufacturing 
towns across the country, helping him earn 20 million votes or about 19% of the total” (Shalken 
2019: 1). His attack on free trade was still remembered by many today. Based on our theory, 
Ross Perot should have a similar negative effect on public trade opinion. We employ the 1992 
ANES data to test the proposition, and our results indeed show a strong and significant “Perot 
effect” on public trade opinion. The results are included in the Supplemental Materials. 
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Additionally, we employ the Voter Study Group (VSG) 2017 survey data to test whether the 
Trump effect remained one year after the election. In this test, we use Americans’ attitudes 
toward free trade as the dependent variable, and one’s Trump favorability as the independent 
variable. We observe a similar effect: Trump favorability in 2017 was still a significant predictor 
of one’s trade attitudes; those who favored Trump were still much more likely to oppose free 
trade in 2017. The results of this robustness test are also included in the Supplemental Materials. 
Taken together, these two tests show additional evidence that the influence of political elites’ 
anti-free trade discourse on public trade opinion is repeatable and enduring.  
Conclusion 
The 2016 presidential election featuring Donald Trump’s attack on open trade and the 
subsequent trade war with China has brought the issue of trade into the center stage of American 
politics. During his campaign and presidential debates in 2016, Trump persistently and fiercely 
attacked the US’s trade deficits, its trade policies and accused other countries of taking 
advantage of the US in international trade. Various public opinion polls show that Americans’ 
support for free trade fell sharply during 2016 (Jones 2017). This paper takes a first step to 
examine the previously overlooked effect of political elites on trade opinion.  
By using the 2016 ANES data, we find that Trump supporters are significantly more likely 
to oppose free trade agreements and support imports restrictions. This relationship remains 
strong and significant even when we control for the possibility of endogeneity (i.e., individuals 
support Trump because of their trade opinion). Interestingly, when we consider Trump support, 
the effect of partisanship on trade opinion disappears. Our additional robustness check suggests 
that Trump effect on trade opinion was not merely a partisan effect, as the Trump effect was 
more salient among Democrats and Independents. Even though Mutz (2017) ascribed the change 
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in trade opinion after 2016 to partisanship, our paper highlights the Trump effect and 
differentiates it from a pure partisan effect. 
Our project also suggests that the effect of Trump support on trade opinion is conditioned by 
one’s political knowledge. The effect of Trump support on trade opinion is larger among 
individuals with higher levels of political knowledge, and this is because knowledgeable 
individuals are more likely to acquire political information and more able to accept political 
messages consistent with their political predispositions. Conversely, individuals with low levels 
of political knowledge do not care about politics as much and as a result are not interested in 
acquiring political information related to complex issues like trade; they are also less likely to 
hold a strong or stable political predisposition, and far less able to analyze or absorb information 
from political elites based on their own political predisposition. Our research provides 
confirmation to Zaller’s view that public opinion is heavily influenced by political elites and that 
political knowledge plays an important role in this process.  
Findings from our paper also suggest a complex reality of presidential support in America 
today. Through his campaign messages, Donald Trump successfully tapped into many 
Americans’ feelings of decline and marginalization in a globalized age and transformed that into 
support and even faith in him. It is often suggested that individuals with lower levels of 
education are more likely to be Trump supporters. However, our research shows that among his 
supporters, it is the more knowledgeable ones who are more likely to be influenced by Trump’s 
views on important issues like trade.  Knowledgeable Trump supporters share a few traits that 
make them the strongest base of Donald Trump: (1) they are sophisticated enough to hold stable 
political predispositions similar to Trump’s views, (2) they are more interested in acquiring 
political messages from Trump and others on complex issues, and (3) they are more capable of 
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analyzing these messages and accept information consistent with their existing predispositions.   
Because Trump’s supporters have similar prejudices and political views with him, messages 
delivered by Trump that carry stereotypical frames will align with their predisposition and result 
in a higher chance for them to accept these messages and update their beliefs. While this is not 
exactly a calculus of economic costs and benefits, it is also not completely “irrational” behavior. 
Although Americans’ perceptions of free trade have declined in recent years, the Pew 
Research Center shows that Americans’ support for free trade already rebounded from a 
historical low in 2017 (Jones 2017). The escalation of the trade war was perhaps the sobering 
moment for many Americans. When businesses witness lower demand of exported products and 
when consumers experience increased price of imported goods, they may start to “feel the pain” 
and shift back toward support for free trade.  
 Our study is not without limitations. Due to limitations of data availability, we did not 
directly test the effect of elite discourse/rhetoric on trade opinion. Experimental studies directly 
linking Trump’s campaign messages on trade and changes in one’s trade opinion could more 
accurately capture the causal mechanism between elite rhetoric and trade opinion. However, at 
the minimum, our study offers a critical perspective for understanding the nature of Americans’ 
attitudes toward free trade in this current political environment. While it remains important to 
consider both economic circumstances and relevant symbolic attitudes in the study of trade 
opinion, we show that it is also critical to consider to what extent individuals’ policy opinions are 
influenced by political elites, and how Americans can form their opinion following political 
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[1] Below are a few examples of Trump’s rhetoric when attacking trade. “We as a nation lost 
$817 billion dollars on trade. That is ridiculous and it is unacceptable.”  “I have visited the cities 
and towns across America and seen the devastation caused by the trade policies of Bill and 
Hillary Clinton…NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere but certainly ever 
signed in this country.”  “You go to New England, Ohio, Pennsylvania, you go anywhere you 
want, and you will see devastation where manufacturing is down 30, 40, sometimes 50 percent.” 
 
[2] Below are a few examples of Trump’s attacks on America’s trade partners: “We're not 
making things anymore, relatively speaking. Our product is pouring in from China, pouring in 
from Vietnam, pouring in from all over the world. We have people that are political hacks 
negotiating our trade deals.” “People have no idea how badly our country has been treated by 
other countries. They've destroyed the steel industry, they've destroyed the aluminum industry.” 
“You take a look at what’s happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast 
amounts of steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelworkers and our 
steel companies.” 
 
[3] Besides these hardcore Trump supporters who share similar political views with him, one 
may argue that there are other types of Trump supporters such as reluctant Republicans 
supporting the nominee of their political party and individuals who dislike Hillary Clinton and as 
a result supported Trump. These unwilling Trump supporters only comprise a very small portion 
of the “big tent” of Trump supporters, as our data show. For example, reluctant Republican 
supporters of Trump (i.e., Republicans who voted for Trump but had a lower than average 
feeling thermometer score of Trump) only comprised 4.1% of all Trump supporters. Individuals 
supporting Trump only because they dislike Hillary Clinton (i.e., individuals who voted for 
Trump but had a lower than average feeling thermometer score for Clinton and Trump) only 
comprised 6.0% of all Trump supporters. Therefore, in this paper we focus our attention on the 
majority of the “big tent” of Trump supporters, or the core groups of Trump supporters, who are 
either economically left behind, or felt a status threat. These two groups may or may not support 
Trump himself, but they both tend to share similar anti-trade and anti-openness views with 
Trump. 
 
 [4] Since the seminal work by Campbell et al. (1960), a rich body of previous research has 
studied the importance of partisanship on public opinion formation. Individuals’ party 
identification is often considered as a “prime mover” of their issue attitudes. Individuals receive 
cues from party leaders, and the cues will then play an influential role in the development of their 
policy positions (e.g. Jacoby 1988; Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Cohen 2003; Johnston 2006). 
The classic “Michigan model” even claims that party identification is the “unmoved mover” of 
political issue attitudes (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960). Political psychologists have identified the 
prevalence of motivated reasoning, where individuals, on a cognitive level, tend to selectively 
receive and interpret information to support certain conclusions that match their party 




[5] Because of our inclusion of ethnocentrism, we estimate our main statistical models by only 
including non-Hispanic white respondents, but present statistical results when considering all 
respondents in our Supplemental Material. The results remain the same. 
 
[6] Responses of this question include seven categories: “oppose a great deal” (6.9%), “oppose 
moderately” (9.46%) “oppose a little” (3.84%) “neither favor nor oppose” (40.31%), “favor a 
little” (6.82%) “favor moderately” (22.84%) and “favor a great deal” (9.85%). Because a 
significant plurality of individuals answered this question neutrally, we combined the three 
“oppose” responses into one, and the three “favor” responses into one category, in order to make 
the three categories more balanced. We also ran the same models by using the original seven-
category variable, and the results remain the same. These results are included in Supplemental 
Material. 
 
[7] We first collect data on wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employee by industry 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), then merge these income data with ANES using 
the NAICS occupation codes. Because 1,595 respondents reported their employment status as 
unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemaker or student, we could only match 
industry-level average income and import orientation data for the rest of the respondents who 
reported a valid industry of occupation.  This limitation resulted in a much smaller sample size of 
our models. To remedy this, we also matched industry-level data based on respondents’ most 
recent occupation if they are unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemakers or 
students. We ran the same models with the expanded sample, and the main results stay the same. 
These additional results and their interpretation are included in the Supplemental Material. 
 
[8] Using information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the US Census Bureau NAICS 
Trade Database, we calculate export and import orientation for each industry. We then match 
each individual with an industry using their self-reported occupation and the NAICS codes. For 
cases in which BEA Industry GDP data was an aggregate of multiple NAICS codes, the total 
import/export amounts for those sectors were added together, and divided by the combined GDP.  
 
[9] These five questions include: (1) how seeing the American flag flying makes the respondent 
feel, (2) how important is American identity to the respondent, (3) whether the world would be 
better if it was more like the USA, (4) if being American means following American customs, 
and (5) whether being American means being born in the USA. We generate a new variable 
nationalism and rescale it to 0-1. The retained principal component factor has an eigenvalue of 
2.34 and an alpha statistic of .71. 
 
[10] The retained principal component factor has an eigenvalue of 2.36 and an alpha statistic of 
.86. 
 
[11] For display purposes we use the 75th percentile value of political knowledge as an example 
of knowledgeable individuals, and the 25th percentile value of political knowledge as an example 





Table 1. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Opposing Import Restrictions 
 
  
   Model (1)   Model (2)  Model (3) 
  












Support for Trump   -0.018*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) 
Political Knowledge 0.103** (0.037) 0.091* (0.038) 0.222*** (0.058) 
Support for Trump × Knowledge     -0.003** (0.001) 
Skill Level  -0.001 (0.002)      -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Import Orientation 0.014 (0.011) 0.016 (0.011) 0.015 (0.011) 
Financial Worry   -0.245*** (0.062) -0.238*** (0.063) -0.237*** (0.063) 
Nationalism  -2.239*** (0.407) -1.373** (0.433) -1.320** (0.438) 
Ethnocentrism  -0.051 (0.072) -0.071 (0.073) -0.069 (0.074) 
Age  -0.009 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) 
Household income  -0.000 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011) 
Party ID  -0.189*** (0.034)      -0.031 (0.044) -0.010 (0.044) 
Education  0.131*** (0.038) 0.113** (0.039) 0.108** (0.039) 
Union Membership  -0.376 (0.213) -0.340 (0.216) -0.332 (0.218) 
Gender  -0.171 (0.140) -0.229 (0.144) -0.200 (0.144) 
N 1195 1191 1191 
 
Note:        * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places. Constant estimates omitted.  
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   Model (1)   Model (2)  Model (3) 
  












Support for Trump   -0.013*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 
Political Knowledge 0.004 (0.027) -0.009 (0.027) 0.078 (0.044) 
Support for Trump× Knowledge     -0.002* (0.001) 
Skill Level  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Import Orientation 0.010 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008) 
Financial Worry   -0.061 (0.045) -0.049 (0.045) -0.046 (0.045) 
Nationalism  -0.904** (0.310) -0.187 (0.333) -0.150 (0.334) 
Ethnocentrism  0.060 (0.054) 0.044 (0.054) 0.050 (0.054) 
Age  0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004 
Household income  0.008 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 
Party ID  -0.099*** (0.026) 0.009 (0.032) 0.022 (0.032) 
Education  0.148*** (0.027) 0.132*** (0.027) 0.129*** (0.028) 
Union Membership  -0.319* (0.158) -0.318* (0.159) -0.301 (0.160) 
Gender  -0.105 (0.102) -0.161 (0.103) -0.144 (0.103) 
N 1539 1534 1534 
 
Note:        * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  









  Dependent Variable: Support for Donald Trump 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  
  First Stage OLS Model   First Stage OLS Model  
 (2nd Stage DV: imports) (2nd Stage DV: free trade) 
 Variable 
 Coefficient  
(b)  
 Standard 
Error (se)  
 Coefficient  
(b)  
 Standard 
Error (se)  
Instruments    
Belief Obama is Muslim 2.649*** (0.257) 2.596*** (0.227) 
Necessity of strong 
leader 
4.677*** (0.595) 4.946*** (0.527) 
Illegal Immigrant Feeling -0.158*** (0.030) -0.148*** (0.027) 
 Political Knowledge 0.363 (0.339) 0.109 (0.300) 
 Skill Level (avg. 
income)  
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 Import Orientation 0.106 (0.100) 0.052 (0.086) 
 Financial Worry   0.603 (0.548) 0.277 (0.489) 
 Nationalism  20.611*** (4.332) 24.200*** (3.784) 
 Ethnocentrism  0.834 (0.701) 0.382 (0.617) 
 Age  0.017 (0.044) 0.035 (0.039) 
 Household income  -0.095 (0.096) -0.073 (0.085) 
 Party ID  6.265*** (0.354) 5.895*** (0.314) 
 Education  -0.375 (0.349) -0.387 (0.304) 
 Union Membership  3.138 (1.916) 2.271 (1.720) 
 Gender  -4.360*** (1.274) -5.155*** (1.116) 
 N  1163  1485  
Note:        * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  




Table 4: Second Stage Models of the IV-2SLS Model 
 Second Stage Dependent Variables 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  
 
Attitudes toward import 
restrictions  
Attitudes toward free trade 
agreements 
 Variable 
 Coefficient  
(b)  
 Standard Error 
(se)  
 Coefficient  
(b)  
 Standard 
Error (se)  
Instrumented IV   
  
 Support for Donald Trump  -0.008*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.002) 
 Political Knowledge 0.015* (0.007) -0.008 (0.010) 
 Skill Level (avg. income)  -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 Import Orientation 0.004 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) 
 Financial Worry   -0.040*** (0.012) -0.023 (0.017) 
 Nationalism  -0.058 (0.108) 0.131 (0.155) 
 Ethnocentrism  -0.017 (0.014) 0.013 (0.020) 
 Age  -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 
 Household income  -0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 
 Party ID  0.033* (0.014) 0.040* (0.019) 
 Education  0.016* (0.008) 0.050*** (0.011) 
 Union Membership  -0.047 (0.042) -0.127* (0.059) 
 Gender  -0.053 (0.028) -0.050 (0.039) 
 N  1163  1485  
Note:        * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places. 





Figure 1. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Attitudes toward Import Restrictions, based on Table 
1 Model (3) 
 
 
(a). Predicted Probability of Opposing Import Restrictions            (b). Predicted Probability of Supporting Import Restrictions 




Figure 2. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Attitudes toward Free Trade Agreements, based on 
Table 2 Model (3)  
 
(a) Favoring Free Trade Agreements among                 (b) Opposing Free Trade Agreements among  
       High-/Low-levels of Political Knowledge                            High-/Low-levels of Political Knowledge 
 
 
 
